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Abstract 
 
The analysis of many budget deficit theories is too demanding for undergraduate students. This 
paper illustrates governments’ incentives to create budget deficits by means of a simple graphical 
model. It integrates four budget deficit theories: The theory of the state as Leviathan, two 
different strategic deficit theories, and the theory of tax competition. These theories are 
embedded into an illustrative example of political competition between a conservative party and 
a liberal party. The main pedagogical benefits of the model are its intuitive setup and its waiver 
of demanding analysis. 
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Introduction 
The phenomenon of chronic, excessive budget deficits and hence rapidly growing public 
debt is one of the most urgent economic problems in Western democracies. Although there is a 
common sense that deficits have to be reduced, governments keep on leaving deficits. This 
hypocritical behavior has incited many explanations and interpretations in both the empirical and 
theoretical literature. Yet, popular political economy and public choice textbooks, such as 
Persson and Tabellini (2000), do not present those explanations in an integrated framework. 
Instead, they focus on several special motifs of deficit creation one at a time. Moreover, most 
budget deficit explanations rely on complex models of intertemporal optimization. These models 
are mathematically demanding, especially for undergraduate students. As a result, many lecturers 
teach the basic principles of budget deficits and public debt to graduate students only. 
As an alternative approach, this article proposes a simple graphical model combining four 
of the most important political-economic explanations of budget deficits. The intuitive setup 
enables the lecturer to familiarize undergraduate students with the deficit problem. The model is 
suitable for blackboard and transparency presentation as well as PowerPoint presentation. Before 
dealing with the model, students should have acquired basic microeconomic knowledge 
(indifference curves, transformation curves, budgetary restrictions, deriving curves in a diagram 
etc.). 
The model focuses on the following budget deficit theories: The first is the theory of the 
government as a ‘Leviathan’ in the sense of Brennan and Buchanan (1980): A government tries 
to extract an extra rent from its citizens by raising tax revenues and budget deficits in excess of 
what it needs to finance the provision of public goods. Both the second and third theories belong 
to the family of strategic deficit theories. They can be distinguished according to the social 
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groups at which the strategy is targeted. On the one hand, a government can target voters in order 
to secure electoral victory (the second theory), either in the next election (e. g. Lizzeri (1999)) or 
the election after the next (e. g. Lockwood et al. (1996)). On the other hand, a government can 
use strategic deficits in order to constrain the spending decisions of possible successors (e.g. 
Tabellini and Alesina (1990) or Persson and Svensson (1989), third theory). The latter authors 
present the appealing idea of a “stubborn” conservative government (Persson and Svensson 
1989, p. 338) that leaves high deficits in order to constrain the liberal successor’s public 
spending and apply this theory to the fiscal policy of the Reagan administration in the US. 
Finally, the fourth theory holds that tax competition prevents governments from raising taxes 
excessively, as this could lead to capital flight, diminishing the overall welfare of an economy 
(Alesina and Tabellini, (1990)). 
We have used the model successfully in macroeconomics lectures at the undergraduate 
level. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the intuitive way of approaching the deficit topic is 
attractive to students and reduces antipathy against economic modeling. 
 
The Model 
The core of the model is a four-quadrants diagram (see figures 3 and 4). In the following 
subsections we will derive the components of the four quadrants step by step. 
 
First Step: The Welfare Functions (South-eastern and North-western Quadrant) 
There are two parties, a conservative (right-wing) party and a liberal (left-wing) party, 
representing capitalists and workers, respectively. Capital is internationally mobile and labor is 
immobile.  
, 0 0    i c ccx X c t with X and X     (1) 
is the welfare function of workers, with 
it  being the tax rate on labor income and c  being the 
degree of social security. The capitalists’ welfare function is 
, 0 0    m i iiy Y i t with Y and Y .     (2) 
Here 
mt  represents the tax rate on mobile capital revenues, whereas i  is the amount of 
capital-specific infrastructure. Figure 1 shows that 
it  and mt  work as shift parameters for the 
functions. These welfare functions will appear in the south-eastern and the north-western 
quadrant of figures 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 1: Welfare functions of workers and capitalists 
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The government decides on the tax rates on capital revenues and labor incomes. There are 
increasing deadweight losses of taxation, i. e. a rise in the tax rate on a production factor causes a 
disproportionately increasing reduction of factor-specific marginal welfare. This reflects 
distortionary tax-collection like progressive labor and capital income taxes
3
. As the government 
faces international tax competition, it can increase its own capital revenue taxes only up to a 
threshold value 
mt . If the government exceeds this threshold value, a complete capital flight from 
the domestic country occurs. 
Conservatives, by ideology, favor capital, liberals, by ideology, favor labor. Any 
government prefers to lower taxes for its ideologically favored production factor, i. e. a 
conservative uses an increasing budget to cut down capital taxes whereas a liberal one cuts down 
income taxes. 
 
Second Step: The Budget Constraint (South-western Quadrant) 
The government can finance social security and infrastructure either by tax revenues or 
by borrowing abroad. It starts with a balanced budget and a debt stock of zero at the beginning of 
the first period. At the end of the second period the budget has to be rebalanced, i. e. further 
deficit-spending and Ponzi games are impossible. Most US states and Canadian provinces have 
such strict intertemporal balanced budget rules on sub-national level
4
. Denote the first period 
budget balance with b . If 0b , there is a first period deficit and the government has to borrow 
that amount on the international capital market. 0b  denotes a first period surplus, the 
government lends to foreign countries
5
. To simplify things, the international interest rate shall be 
equal to zero; in order to prevent the problem of Ricardian equivalence, private savings are 
assumed to be absent or not to be influenced by the government’s tax and deficit decisions6.  
 
Third Step: The Voters (North-eastern Quadrant) 
The linear-homogenous popularity function  
, 0, 0, 0 0      x y xx yyu U x y with U U U and U    (3) 
describes the government’s popularity among voters. 
The model covers two periods and there is an election at the end of each period, with the 
voters’ preferences being time-consistent. These preferences are mapped as iso-popularity curves 
in the north-eastern quadrant of figures 3 and 4. Due to the properties of the popularity function, 
they are negatively sloped and convex. In line with the well known political business cycle 
model of Hibbs (1977), voters are backward looking, rewarding or punishing the government’s 
behavior in the last period. If the government provides an x-y-allocation below the re-election 
ensuring iso-popularity curve, it will loose the next election. The north-eastern quadrant shows 
the re-election ensuring iso-popularity curves for two different cases: a) voters prefer workers’ 
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welfare over capitalists’ welfare (iso-popularity curve 
lwU ) or b) voters prefer capitalists’ 
welfare over workers’ welfare (iso-popularity curve 
rwU )
7
. Throughout the following, the model 
will follow case a), as this case is in accordance with empirical evidence in Western 
democracies. Research shows that labor income is widely spread across the population, whereas 
capital income concentrates on a relatively small group of voters. As a result, many of these 
countries have higher tax rates on capital than on labor (Daveri and Tabellini, 1997)
8
. 
 
The Government 
Each government pursues a combined strategy of re-election and ideology. In line with 
the literature on strategic deficits, the government either tries to influence voters’ behavior or the 
succeeding government’s behavior. In line with the Leviathan-literature, the government does 
not use up the whole budget for social security and infrastructure and extracts the difference as 
additional rent. In line with the tax competition literature, the government has to take care about 
the fact that the country is constantly threatened by capital flight. Figure 2 gives a short overview 
of the governments’ actions in both periods.  
 
Figure 2: Time-structure of the model 
 
Throughout the following, we focus on the case of a conservative first period 
government, as this is more illustrative. 
 
The Conservative Party Holds Office 
Leaving a Balanced Budget 
In the reference case the first period budget is balanced 0b . The budget restriction in 
the south-western quadrant of Figure 3 displays all feasible combinations of c and i. This 
determines the level of popularity the government can reach through the provision of social 
security and infrastructure. If the government fails in achieving re-election, it wants to ensure 
that it wins the second-period election at least.  
Suppose that the conservative government chooses the tax rates 1 1,m it t . The north-
eastern quadrant shows the consequences of this choice: Under a balanced budget the policy 
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1 1,m it t  yields the transformation curve AB in x-y-space. If the transformation curve reaches the 
iso-popularity curve, the government will win the election, otherwise not. Figure 3 shows a case 
where the fiscal policy set 1 1, , 0m it t b  does not ensure re-election
9
. 
Figure 4 displays the possible actions of a liberal successor if the conservative government 
fails in ensuring re-election. If the conservative government leaves behind a balanced budget, the 
liberal successor can raise capital income taxes and its worker-friendly policy will be 0,m it t . 
Then the transformation curve GH in Figure 4 would be high enough to ensure the liberal 
successor’s re-election, as the iso-popularity curve 
lwU  is intersected
10
. To leave a balanced 
budget is thus an unfavorable policy for the conservative government. 
 
Figure 3: Behavior of the conservative government in the first period 
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Leaving a Deficit 
If the conservative government borrows on international capital markets (i. e. 0b ), the 
budget constraint in the south-western quadrant of figure 3 shifts to the left. Now the government 
is able to provide any amount of social security and infrastructure at a lower tax rate. 
Alternatively, it can provide a higher amount of social security and infrastructure at the same tax 
rate. 
Assume that the government lowers taxes on capital, setting a fiscal policy 
0 1( , ), 0m it t b . The capitalists’ welfare curve in the north-western quadrant of Figure 3 shifts 
upwards to 0, mY i t . This changes the transformation curve in the north-eastern quadrant to CD. 
According to the Leviathan-theory, the government will spend only a part of its budget for social 
security and infrastructure and keep the remainder as a rent that “represents pure profits from 
governing” (Sinn 1992, p. 183). In this case we get the transformation curve EF in Figure 3. 
However, even the debt-financed higher-spending on x cannot prevent the conservative 
government from being voted out of office. Waiving of the private rent would not help either. 
But nonetheless the government chooses the fiscal policy set 0 1, , 0m it t b .  
The reason is that the government anticipates the policy of the liberal successor (figure 
4). As further deficit-spending is ruled out, the liberal government must serve public debt. In 
figure 4 the budget constraint shifts to the right by the amount borrowed abroad. Normally, a 
liberal government would prefer to raise capital tax rates in excess of 
mt  in order to serve public 
debt and keep taxes on labor income at the level
0it . But the threat of capital flight works as an 
additional constraint here. Capitalists would respond to a higher capital tax rate by moving their 
assets abroad. This cannot happen without a reduction of labor welfare, and, as a consequence, 
overall domestic popularity. 
The liberal government cannot raise the capital tax rate beyond
mt . The only way to serve 
public debt is to demand higher taxes 
1it  on labor, initializing a tax policy set 1,m it t  with 
transformation curve IJ. 
But in this case the liberal government lacks the popularity to ensure re-election, which 
means that the conservative party will regain power at the end of the second period. Hence, by 
choosing the strategic fiscal policy 0 1, , 0m it t b  in the first period the conservative 
government acts according to the deficit theories outlined in the introduction: 
1) It extracts an additional rent for itself in the sense of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) 
(see Figure 2). 
2) It ensures re-election, not immediately but at least at the end of the second period – a 
strategy that follows the ideas of Lockwood et al. (1996). 
3) It commits the liberal successor to a less liberal policy. Hence, it is “stubborn” in the 
sense of Persson and Svensson (1989, p. 338).  
4) It uses international tax competition as a tool to put pressure on the successor similar 
to the model of Alesina and Tabellini (1990).  
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Figure 4: Behavior of the liberal government in the second period 
 
Alternatively, assume that 1,m it t  would ensure the liberal successor’s re-election (in 
this case IJ would touch 
lwU ). Should the conservative party abstain from leaving a deficit then? 
The answer is ‘no’. Although the re-election incentive is irrelevant now, the incentive to extract 
an extra rent still exists. Furthermore, the deficit constrains the liberal successor to a policy that 
is more in the conservative government’s interest. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper brings mathematically sophisticated budget deficit theories down to 
undergraduate level. A simple graphical model allows the lecturer to illustrate up to four major 
political-economic theories of budget deficits in a unified framework. Although the paper lacks 
some budget deficit theories - e. g. the “war of attrition” (Alesina and Drazen, 1991, p. 1170) in a 
coalition government or the common pool problem in a federal country (Velasco, 2000) - it helps 
to make students aware of the deficit problem. It also demonstrates the explanatory power of 
intuitive, non-mathematical approaches without derivation of a general equilibrium. 
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